We investigate whether or not aspects of corporate governance that commonly appear in governance reforms and best practice recommendations are priced in the market place. We do so by focusing on the premiums that Directors' and Officers' Liability insurers charge client firms. Using a sample that spans different liability regimes, we find that some aspects of governance emphasized in regulatory reforms are reflected in the premiums that D&O insurers charge. In particular, board size is associated with higher premiums. However, premiums are unrelated to CEO/Board Chair duality, and surprisingly, there is evidence to suggest that insurance premiums increase with board independence. At the same time, the results appear to be sensitive to the method used, and thus further exploration of the appropriate empirical specification is warranted.
Introduction
Corporate governance has evolved at a rapid pace during the last decade with many markets adopting sweeping governance reforms. For example, in the U.S., the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) mandated certain board structures for all firms. In contrast, markets such as the U.K. and Canada have developed codes of "best-practice" and allowed firms to comply with best-practice recommendations or explain their noncompliance. From this perspective, rather than imposing "one-size-fits-all" governance, regulators have allowed firms to adopt governance structures that arguably best suit their needs.
At issue, however, is the efficacy of such reforms and whether or not they focus on aspects of governance that are likely to enhance shareholder protection. Some argue that mandatory regulations move firms away from their optimal governance structures, and thus are costly (e.g., Linck, Netter and Yang, (2007) , Zhang (2006) ).
1 However, others contend that aspects of recent regulatory reforms are beneficial (e.g., Cohen, Dey and Lys, 2006 and Ashbaugh, Collins and Kinney, 2006) . Moreover, Dahya, McConnell and Travlos (2002) and Dahya and McConnell (2005) suggest that firm and board performance improves for firms that comply with the U.K. Cadbury Code of Conduct's best-practice governance recommendations.
At the same time, several recent papers find evidence suggesting that different aspects of governance are associated with earnings restatements or fraud, both of which 1 Cohen, Dey and Lys, (2006) find a decline in earnings management and an increase of the information content of earnings announcements in the post Sarbanes-Oxley period. Ashbaugh, Collins, Kinney, Lafond, (2006) present evidence pointing to cost of capital benefits from resolving internal control deficiencies.
4 increase the likelihood of lawsuits. In particular, Agrawal and Chadha (2005) find that the probability of earnings restatements is significantly lower in firms whose boards include an independent financial expert. Further, Burns and Kedia (2006) report that firms where CEOs have high-powered incentives are likely to restate earnings.
We contribute to the literature by providing insights as to whether or not aspects of corporate governance, including those that commonly appear in governance reforms and best practice recommendations, are priced in the marketplace. We do so by using information about firms' Directors' and Officers' (D&O) liability insurance coverage.
D&O liability insurance protects corporate directors and officers by covering expenses and damages in the event that the firm is sued. One significant source of exposure is from shareholder litigation which, arguably, arises in cases where management or board actions deviate from shareholders' interests. 2 Put differently, shareholder suits are potentially indicative of extreme agency conflicts.
Several authors, including Mayers and Smith (1982) and Holderness (1990) ,
confer an important monitoring role to corporate insurers. Moreover, insurers have unique access to information pertaining to client firms' governance and operations.
Given that insurers are at risk if client firms are sued, they have incentives to assess both the client's litigation risk and the quality of governance mechanisms that clients use to mitigate this risk. From this perspective, we can view D&O insurance premiums as market prices that capture a client firm's litigation risk and the quality of the firm's corporate governance.
Our analysis also focuses on several different time periods that capture both an increased focus on corporate governance and changing regulatory regimes. Our choice of 5 sample and time period offers several advantages over alternate settings. First, we are able to observe detailed data pertaining to D&O insurance coverage including limits, deductibles, and premiums charged by insurers. Second, unlike settings where all companies are required to comply, for much of our period the reforms were voluntary.
Thus, the sample exhibits variation in governance variables of interest, and allows for more powerful tests of "what matters in corporate governance," at least to D&O insurers.
Third, our time period spans the implementation of SOX-like reforms in Canada, and this allows pre-and post-comparisons for recent reforms. Finally, while our sample focuses on Canadian companies, many of these firms are cross-listed in the U.S.. As noted by a number of authors, international firms may cross list in the U.S. as a governance mechanism. That is, cross-listing typically commits the firm to a more stringent regulatory and litigation regime than that of their home country (Coffee (1999 (Coffee ( , 2002 , Stulz (1999) , Karolyi, Lins, Miller (2007) , and Stulz (2007) ). As a result, our analysis also provides insights into aspects of litigation risk for cross listed firms. These regulatory changes are indicative of periods during which markets and regulators increased their focus on corporate governance issues. As a result, if such issues are perceived to be important by insurers, then they should be priced during these periods.
The Role of D&O Insurance in Corporate Governance
Mayers and Smith (1982) argue that corporate insurers scrutinize client firms and thus monitor corporate management. Similarly, Holderness (1990) argues that D&O insurance exposes managers to external scrutiny. 5 Indeed, Baker and Griffith (2007) 7 report survey evidence suggesting that, while D&O insurers primarily adopt a qualitative approach to assessing governance structures, they do consider governance attributes in the pricing decision. In particular, insurers focus on aspects of board structure, compensation policy, and the strength of internal control systems. Our focus, given the global emphasis on "good governance" is on the extent to which the best-practice components of proposed governance reforms are priced by D&O insurers, however we will also examine other governance attributes.
Aspects of the association between governance and D&O insurance have been studied previously. However, the evidence as to what elements of governance are important in the context of D&O insurance is somewhat mixed. For example, Core (2000) explicitly focuses on the association between governance characteristics and D&O pricing. Using a cross-section of 110 Canadian firms with D&O coverage in the early 1990's, a period prior to governance reforms, he finds that insurance premiums are higher when insiders have more voting control, when inside ownership is lower, and when boards are less independent. Core also reports that the presence of: senior executive employment contracts, golden parachutes, and the presence of a staggered board, poison pill, or other takeover restriction are associated with increased premiums. On balance, Core concludes that liability insurance is priced to reflect the firm's business risk and the quality of its governance structures.
In contrast, Chalmers, Dann and Harford (2002) , find no significant association between insurance coverage or premiums and board independence or the presence of indemnification provisions. Park (2004) suggests that firms with more D&O insurance coverage provide faster and more timely and accurate information, which ultimately is in shareholder interests. Two other aspects of the prior literature are of note. First, many of these papers focus on periods prior to the increased focus on corporate governance. Second, the majority of the prior studies are conditional analyses in the sense that they examine samples of firms that have purchased D&O insurance. In contrast, as discussed below, our sample comprises firms with and without insurance. Thus, we are able to examine both the firm's purchase decision (in terms of whether or not to purchase coverage, and how much) and the insurer's pricing decision. Our primary focus is on whether or not aspects of recent regulatory reforms focusing on board structure appear to be priced by insurers. Specifically, the boardrelated factors emphasized in the Dey report: that boards comprise a majority of independent directors, be smaller, split the CEO and COB positions, and that all board committees comprise independent directors. Our hypotheses are stated in the null, and then the alternate. In the alternate we also indicate our priors as to directionality. 6 Chalmers et al suggest that managers of IPO firms are opportunistic in their insurance purchase decision as abnormal levels of coverage are associated with worse post-IPO performance. 7 Boyer discusses the probability of insurance purchase as a function of firm characteristics, but does not incorporate that into the premium decision, while Core (2000) reports that his results are robust when using a two-stage model that accounts for selection issues. The Dey reforms appear to be predicated on the assumption that the board's effectiveness is dependent on its composition, and the empirical evidence to date supports this perspective. For example, board independence contributes objectivity and improves the board's oversight role (Byrd and Hickman, (1992) ). In addition, there is evidence consistent with the board's monitoring ability being compromised as additional directors are added. For example, Yermack (1996) finds a negative association between board size and firm performance. Other studies report that firms with combined board chair -CEO positions have diminished performance (e.g. Yermack (1996) , Shivdasani and Yermack (1998) ). However, the evidence on this issue is mixed as Brickley, Coles, and Jarrell (1997) find no association between firm performance and CEO duality. Our prior is that, if these factors are important in the context of mitigating extreme agency conflicts, then they will be priced by the D&O insurers, and thus reflected in the premiums they charge.
A second hypothesis focuses on aspects of firms' governance, other than those in the Dey Report, that arguably act to decrease existing agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. In particular, ownership structure is a potentially powerful mechanism for controlling agency problems. As McConnell and Servaes (1990) show, concentrated ownership provides monitoring incentives and potentially mitigates the free-rider problem. Moreover, agency theory posits that managerial ownership can also serve to attenuate agency problems (Shleifer and Vishny (1986) (2003)). Given the prevalence of dual class firms in our sample, we also examine this aspect of ownership structure.
The governance literature includes other mechanisms that may also limit the disciplining effect of the market for corporate control and can be viewed as promoting weak governance. For example, Borokhovich, Brunarski and Parrino (1997) and Comment and Schwert (1995) suggest that firms adopting takeover measures are subject to fewer takeover bids, pay higher CEO compensation, and face an increased litigation if shareholders attempt to remove the takeover deterrents. Similarly, Faleye (2006) concludes that classified boards significantly insulate management from market discipline. Thus we also examine the association between premiums and the presence of classified boards.
Finally, as noted by a number of authors international firms may cross list in the U.S. as a governance mechanism. That is, cross-listing typically commits the firm to a more stringent regulatory and litigation regime than that of their home country (Coffee (1999 , 2002 ), Stulz (1999 , Karolyi, Lins, Miller, and Stulz (2007) ). As a result, our analysis also provides insights into aspects of litigation risk for cross listed firms. Prior work has shown that firms cross-listed tend to have higher premiums. Moreover, given that our sample spans several different regulatory regimes, our analysis will also provide insights as to how D&O insurers perceive the nature of litigation risk to have changed over time.
(H20): Conditioned on the presence of D&O liability insurance coverage, the premium a firm pays is unrelated to the firms' ownership structure (inside ownership, blockholder ownership, and dual class voting structures, the presence of a classified board or cross-listing in U.S. Despite our priors as to the directionality of the relationships, the central issue is the extent to which these factors are priced by insurers, and this remains an empirical question. To that end, in the following section we describe our sample, and discuss the empirical approach. For the Dey variables, the median insurance premiums differ significantly across the four sub-samples for both board size and board independence, however there is no difference when we split the sample based on CEO/Chair duality. In terms of the other governance variables, we finds that premiums differ across the four groups for block ownership, and that premiums are higher for firms with dual class voting structures or a U.S. cross listing. However, there are no differences across groups formed on the basis of block ownership. When focusing on the contracting variables we see that for CEO salary, bonus, and the ratio of incentive to total pay premiums differ significantly across the four subgroups. In addition, premiums are higher for firms with severance arrangements or employment agreements. It is also interesting to note that, as posited by Myers and Smith (1982) , premiums increase monotonically with firm size and with debt.
While the univariate analyses are suggestive of premiums that vary with firm characteristics, at issue is whether or not these results persist in the context of multivariate analyses that attempt to address both sample selection and endogeneity issues.
Multivariate Analyses
Of course, endogeneity problems and selection biases are concerns for our analysis. In this regard we differ slightly from the prior work analyzing premiums in that we first conduct a preliminary analysis focusing on the likelihood of a firm purchasing D&O insurance. We then examine premiums from two different empirical perspectives.
First, using a Tobit specification, where we interpret the decision not to purchase insurance (and thus have a zero premium) as representing a corner solution. Second, to examine the robustness of the results to alternate specifications, we explicitly model the insurance selection process using a two-stage Heckman procedure.
Preliminary Analyses
We first model the probability of a firm having D&O insurance as a function of key independent variables that we wish to examine later in the paper. These entail three main sets of variables, those related to the Dey report, other governance factors, and aspects of the contracting environment, along with controls.
(Dey, Other Governance, Contracting, Controls) Table 3 reports the results of several different specifications where we focus on key elements of the Dey recommendation, other governance variables, and features of the contracting environment. The findings suggest that the insurance purchase decision is indeed related to aspects of governance structure. Notably, the likelihood of a firm having insurance increases with board size and independence, the presence of a blockholder, cross-listed in the U.S., the level of CEO compensation, and the presence of severance agreements for senior executives. Interestingly, the likelihood of purchasing insurance decreases as CEO incentives increase. Moreover, the likelihood of purchasing insurance is also higher in 2005, consistent with the general perception of a heightened litigation environment. Overall, these results suggest that selection biases are of concern.
As a result, our first analyses models premiums in the context of a Tobit analysis.
Tobit Analysis
The main focus of our analysis is on D&O premiums and how they are associated with governance structures. Premiums are set in an independent manner by the insurers and the contracts are periodically renegotiated after a thorough re-evaluation of the firm's risk factors. As a result, our hope is that endogeneity resulting from reverse-causality is less of a concern in this aspect of the analysis. 11 However, this does not preclude the possibility of endogeneity resulting from omitted variables -that is, missing variable that affect both the premium and governance structure -and we address this issue via a changes analysis later in the paper.
Consistent with Core (1997) and the evidence presented in Baker and Griffith (2007), we assume that the market for D&O insurance is competitive and that firms are able to purchase insurance. Moreover, given that potential selection bias may be an issue
we first employ a Tobit specification. The dependent variable in this analysis is the natural logarithm of the insurance premium paid. Given that a significant percentage of the firms in our sample does not carry D&O liability insurance, the Tobit specification accounts for the selection bias inherent in the insurance purchase decision. Table 4 reports the key results from this analysis. With regard to the Dey variables, we find some evidence that premiums increase with board size, consistent with the interpretation that insurers view board size as a risk factor. Surprisingly, the coefficient on board independence is positive, suggesting that insurers charge a higher premium as board independence increases. This is somewhat counter-intuitive, but might also be indicative of a residual endogeneity problem.
Premium = f(Firm Governance Characteristics, Controls)
Several other findings are also of interest. First, we find that an increase in the percentage held by blockholders is associated with higher premiums, consistent with an interpretation that blockholders may serve to entrench management, rather than act as monitors of managerial behavior. Premiums also increase with other aspects of the contracting environment, notably the level of total compensation, and in some specifications the presence of severance arrangements. These findings are consistent with those of Core (2000) and are suggestive of contracting arrangements that potentially entrench managers. Of interest, however, is the evidence (in Model 3) suggesting that premiums tend to decrease with the level of incentive-based compensation. This runs somewhat counter to the U.S. findings that higher incentives are associated with an increased propensity of firms to restate earnings or be sued. We also find that premiums tend to be higher with prior litigation.
Also of note is the coefficient on the U.S. cross-listing indicator. We find that premiums increase with a U.S. listing, consistent with the prior literature and the perception that cross-listing exposes firms to a more litigious environment. In order to further investigate the impact of cross listing in U.S. and differentiate across the different time periods we cover, we introduce another specification (Model 5) that includes all an interaction variable of U.S. cross-listing and year. We find that the later year, 2005, shows significantly higher premiums for cross-listed firms, confirming the expectation of an increased liability premium in U.S. in the post SOX environment.
The findings suggest that a number of aspects of governance and the contracting environment are important to D&O insurers. The finding that D&O insurers charge lower premiums for smaller boards is consistent with the general perception in the literature, and that of regulators, that smaller boards are beneficial. At the same time, however, the same cannot be said for either board independence for CEO/Chair duality.
CEO/Chair consistently lacks significance, suggesting that insurers do not explicitly value this aspect of governance. While the finding that board independence is associated with increased premiums does not support the regulatory focus on increased independence, we are more cautious in our interpretation given potential endogeneity concerns.
Selection Model Approach
Our second empirical approach generally follows that developed by Core (1997) and used by others such as O'Sullivan (1997) and Boyer (2003) , in that we estimate "abnormal" insurance coverage as an input to the analysis of insurance premiums.
However, we differ in that we also employ a two-stage selection model in the premium analysis.
The first stage of this approach entails a probit estimation where the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable taking a value of one for firms carrying D&O Consistent with our earlier analysis we model the premium as a function of firm and governance characteristics. Again we incorporate our three sets of variables, Dey, other governance factors, and aspects of the contracting environment, along with control variables. In addition, we include the "abnormal" coverage and the inverse Mills ratio from the selection model (to control for the part of the error term in the regression 20 equation that is correlated with the probability of carrying insurance). We report the results in Table 5 (for brevity we only report the second stage OLS coefficients).
There are some notable differences relative to the Tobit analysis. First, board size is significantly associated with premiums, suggesting that insurers perceive larger boards as being less effective monitors. Moreover, an increase in the percentage held by blockholders is associated with lower premiums, consistent with an interpretation that blockholders play a monitoring role. Dual class voting structures are associated with higher premiums, which is supportive of earlier studies suggesting that potential conflicts of interest are higher in such firms. Premiums also increase with other aspects of the contracting environment, notably severance arrangements, employment agreements, and the level of CEO compensation. These findings are generally consistent with those of
Core (2000) and are suggestive of contracting arrangements that potentially entrench managers. Of interest, however, is that the premiums tend to decrease with the level of incentive-based compensation. This runs somewhat counter to the U.S. findings that higher incentives are associated with an increased propensity of firms to restate earnings or be sued. We also find that premiums increase with abnormal coverage, prior litigation, and firm size, debt, and that premiums are notably higher in 2005 consistent with a heightened litigation environment.
Our results are suggestive of various aspects of corporate governance being important in the D&O insurance pricing decision. However, as noted above, there remain some potential endogeneity concerns. In addition, prior evidence suggests that there may be some non-linearities at work. To address these issues we conduct a series of robustness checks. To investigate potential non-linearities, we estimate additional specifications in which we add consequently a squared term for D&O ownership, incentives, board size, and board independence. We find that none of the squared terms are significant and, moreover, the presence of the squared term does not change in general the sign or significance of the original simple term coefficient.
Second, to address potential endogeneity issues we conduct a changes analysis on the premium decision. In doing so, we focus on the set of firms that is common throughout the three years of our sample. The results here suggest that a U.S. crosslisting is associated with a significant increase in premiums, while increased board independence is associated with lower premiums. Finally, we replicate the main hypotheses in the Heckman two-stage model by using alternate dependent variables to the log premiums: the dollar values of the premiums and the ratio of premiums to maximum coverage.
Conclusions
On balance, our findings suggest that a number of aspects of governance and the contracting environment are viewed as important by D&O insurers. The finding that D&O insurers charge larger premiums for smaller boards is consistent with the general perception in the literature, and that of regulators, that smaller boards are beneficial. At the same time, however, the same cannot be said for either board independence or for CEO/Chair duality. CEO/Chair consistently lacks significance, suggesting that insurers do not explicitly value this aspect of governance. While the finding that board independence is associated with increased premiums does not support the regulatory focus on increased independence, we are more cautious in our interpretation given potential endogeneity concerns.
Moreover, we find that there are some notable differences in terms of which variables are significant in a Tobit specification versus a Heckman two-stage analysis.
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This suggests that the empirical specification used by researchers in this area is potentially important, and our ongoing analysis will attempt to explore this more fully.
Appendix A Excerpted Dey Recommended Guidelines For Improved Corporate Governance
The following are the proposed guidelines for effective corporate governance:
The board of directors of every corporation should explicitly assume responsibility for the stewardship of the corporation and as part of the overall stewardship responsibility, should assume responsibility for the following matters: adoption of a corporate strategy; succession planning, including appointing, training and monitoring senior management; a communications program for the corporation the integrity of the corporation's internal control and management information systems.
(paragraphs 4.2, 4.3 and 4.6)
The board of directors of every corporation should be constituted with a majority of individuals who qualify as unrelated directors. An unrelated director is a director who is free from any interest and any business or other relationship which could, or could reasonably be perceived to, materially interfere with the director's ability to act with a view to the best interests of the corporation. (paragraphs 5.7 and 5.8)
The application of the definition of "unrelated director" to the circumstances of each individual director should be the responsibility of the board which will be required to disclose on an annual basis which directors qualify as unrelated directors and will be required to disclose the analysis of the application of the principles supporting this conclusion. (paragraph 5.18)
The board of directors of every corporation should appoint a committee of directors composed exclusively of outside, i.e. non-management directors, a majority of whom are unrelated directors, with the responsibility for proposing to the full board new nominees to the board and for assessing directors. Every board of directors should expressly assume responsibility for, or assign to a committee of directors, the general responsibility for developing the corporation's approach to governance issues. This committee would, amongst other things, be responsible for the corporation's response to these governance guidelines. (paragraph 6.4)
Every board of directors should have in place appropriate structures and procedures to ensure that the board can function independently of management. These structures and procedures may involve the board meeting on a regular basis without management present or may involve expressly assigning responsibility for administering the board's relationship to management to a committee of the board. These means are described in guideline (13). (paragraph 6.10)
The board of directors, together with the CEO, should develop position descriptions for the board and for the CEO, involving the definition of the limits to management's responsibilities. In addition, the board should approve or develop the corporate objectives which the CEO is responsible for meeting. (paragraph 6.14)
Every board of directors should either (i) appoint a chair of the board who is not a member of management or (ii) adopt alternate means for implementing guideline (11), so that the board is able to function independently of management; this could include assigning the responsibility to ensure the board discharges its responsibilities to a committee of the board or to a director, sometimes referred to as the "lead director". (paragraph 6.16)
The audit committee of every board of directors should be composed only of outside directors. The roles and responsibilities of the audit committee should be specifically defined so as to provide appropriate guidance to audit committee members as to their duties. The audit committee should have direct communication channels with the internal and external auditors to discuss and review specific issues as appropriate. The audit committee duties should include oversight responsibility for management reporting on internal control. While it is management's responsibility to design and implement an effective system of internal control, it is the responsibility of the audit committee to ensure that management has done so. (paragraph 6.20)
The board of directors should implement a system which enables an individual director to engage an outside adviser at the expense of the corporation in appropriate circumstances. The engagement of the outside advisor should be subject to the approval of an appropriate committee of the board. (paragraph 6.30)
Other Recommendations
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The implementation of our proposals is based upon the recommendation to The Toronto Stock Exchange: that the Exchange adopt, as a listing requirement, the disclosure by each listed corporation of its approach to corporate governance; on an annual basis commencing with companies with June 30, 1995 year ends. (paragraphs 8.1 and 8.2)
In addition, the Report contains recommendations for legislative reform which are summarized as follows:
We recommend that the governing corporate statutes be revised to eliminate any possible interpretation of the directors' responsibility as being to manage the business day-to-day. Rather, the statutes should describe the responsibility as being to supervise the management of the business. (paragraph 4.10)
The government departments responsible for the administration of the corporate laws in each of the federal and provincial jurisdictions should undertake a review of all legislation exacted in their particular jurisdiction imposing personal liability upon directors. Following the review, all legislatures should repeal or modify legislation imposing personal liability on directors which no longer serves the purpose for which it was enacted and legislation not so repealed should be amended to ensure directors are provided with an effective due diligence defense. In each year we divide the samples into two groups by insurance status. For each variable we calculate means and medians (in parentheses) and statistics (p-values in parentheses) for a 2 sample t-test as well as z-values for Wilcoxon tests. Insurance variables displayed are premiums, total coverage and deductibles (all in thousands) and the ratio of premium to total coverage. For the Dey Report-emphasized variables we report CEO/board chair duality, board size and percentage of independent board members . Other governance variables include percentage ownership held in total by all owners with 10 percent or more of the outstanding shares, D&O ownership-ownership of directors and officers as a group, and the presence of a dual-class ownership structure. Executive compensation variables reported are: CEO salary, bonus and total compensation (all in thousands) and the ratio of incentives to total compensation. Other variables of the contracting environment include: the presence of a classified Table 4 Tobit Regression This table presents results of a series of Tobit regression where the dependent variable is the log of the D&O insurance premium paid. Model 1 includes the variables emphasized in the Dey report (CEO duality, board size and independence), and controls for business risk (size free cash flow, debt to equity, return on assets and an indicator variable for prior litigation) along with year indicators. Models two and thre include other governance variables (block ownership, D&O ownership, and indictors for Dual class voting structure, classified board, and US listing) and contracting variables (capturing the level of CEO pay, the proportion of CEO pay that is incentive-based, and indicators for the presence of a severance or employment agreement. Model 4 incorporates all variables of interest, while Model 5 adds an indicator variable that interacts the year with U.S, cross-listing. This table presents results of a two-stage Heckman specification, where the first stage is a probit controling for the insurance purchase decision and a second stage OLS where the dependent variable is the log of the insurance premium paid. Model 1 the variables empasized in the Dey report (CEO duality-an indicator variable equal to one if the CEO is also the chair of the board, board size and percentabge of board independence, controls (size, free cash flow, debt to equity ratio, return on assets and an indicator for incidencen of prior litigation) and year dummies. This table presents results of the OLS regression where the dependent variable is the log of the maximum in surance coverage a firm carries. Model 1 includes variables emphasized in the Dey report (CEO duality-an indicator variable equal to one if the CEO is also the chair of the board, board size and the percentabge of independent directors on the board) along with controls (size, free cash flow, debt to equity ratio, return on assets and an indicator for incidence of prior litigation) and year indicators. Models 2 and 3 include other governance variables: Blocks % is the total percentage of shares held by blockholders with 10% or more, D&O own is ownership by directors and officers, indicators for presence of Dual Class voting structures, Classified Board and U.S. cross-listed firms. Contracting environment variables include \: CEO total compensation, CEO incentives as a fraction of total compensation, and indicators for severance or employment agreements. Model 4 presents coefficients for a specification using only controls, while Model 5 includes all variables.
